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Abstract
We document gender differences in the behavior of similar workers within a firm
when they book business air travel. We show that women pay consistently less per ticket
than men, after accounting for a large set of covariates that include the characteristics
of the traveler, the routes and class they travel on, the firms that employ them, and the
position that the traveler holds in the firm. A large proportion of the lower fares paid
by women is explained by women booking flights earlier than men. We find significant
variation in gender differences across the regions of the world. Using country-level data
on preference differences, we show that gender differences in both positive and negative
reciprocity are an important factor associated with the documented gender differences.
In particular, negative reciprocity alone is able to explain the gender difference in paid
fare: women (men) are less (more) willing to trade the firms’ money for their own utility
when they feel they have been treated unfairly. The documented gender differences have
both important monetary implications for firms and implications for the role of morale
within the firm.
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1 Introduction
Despite there being robust evidence about fundamental differences in the preferences of men
and women, less is understood about how these differences manifest in the behavior of work-
ers within firms. Measuring and comparing the behavior of individual workers within a
firm is challenging. For many firms, data is only available at the plant or firm level. One
approach to understanding individual differences involves estimating a production function
using plant-level or firm-level output, and using the structure to identify gender differences.1
Alternatively, it is possible to directly measure the behavior of individual workers in the small
fraction of occupations where output is directly recorded, such as lawyers, real estate agents,
and salespeople.2
This paper takes a complementary approach by studying gender differences in the per-
formance of a specific task: the booking of business air travel. By studying a single task, we
directly observe individual behavior and include workers from many different occupations,
firms, and countries. Our dataset contains information about the business travel behavior of
around two million unique travelers working in over 8,000 unique firms, in over 60 countries,
for the year 2014. It allows us to account for a large set of covariates (over 43 thousand
fixed effects in our preferred specification) that includes the characteristics of the traveler,
the routes and class they travel on, the firms that employ them, and the position that the
traveler holds in the firm, among others. About 25 percent of the workers in our dataset are
women.
We document significant gender differences in the performance of similar workers within
a firm. Women pay consistently less per ticket than men, after accounting for these rich set
of covariates. The covariates explain over 90 percent of the variation in the price paid of an
airline booking. We find that approximately 70 percent of the estimated gender difference is
explained by women booking flights earlier than men. Woman are five percent more likely
to book at least two weeks in advance compared to men after accounting for our set of
covariates. The observed gender difference results in a savings of 15.48 U.S. dollars per trip.
1See, e.g., Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) and Gallen (2018).
2See, e.g., Azmat and Ferrer (2017) and Cook, Diamond, Hall, List, and Oyer (2018) for studies using
data on lawyers and Uber drivers, respectively.
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This represents a savings of about 3.1 (1.9) percent of the median (mean) price of a plane
ticket.
We find significant heterogeneity in the estimated gender differences. We estimate models
that include gender interactions with age, length of stay, traveler type, and region. We find
significant variation by region of the world. Workers in the United States and Europe exhibit
the largest gender differences. Differences are smaller in South America, non-significant in
Australia, and inverted in Asia. Women book tickets that are on average $10 more expensive
in Asia compared to men. This heterogeneity suggests that cultural influences may play
an important role in understanding gender differences.3 We also find that gender differences
increase with age, where the difference is $11.75 for workers less than 25 years old, and $18.89
for workers between 55 and 64 years old. Interestingly, we do not find any deviation from
this trend during the childbearing years. Finally, we do not observe heterogeneity in gender
differences by traveler or trip type. Gender differences do not substantively change when
considering travelers who fly few or many trips in a year. With the exception of trips that
last less than 24 hours, gender differences do not vary with length of the trip.
Next we investigate potential mechanisms that could explain the observed gender differ-
ences in both fare paid and advanced booking. To do that, we complement the business
travel data with information about economic preferences in each country.4 Preference data
is obtained from the Global Preference Survey documented in Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke,
Huffman, and Sunde (2018). We consider gender differences in patience, risk taking, altruism,
positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust. We show that gender differences in both
negative and positive reciprocity are important factors associated with gender differences in
both fare paid and advanced booking. In particular, negative reciprocity alone is able to
explain the observed gender difference in paid fare. The main insight of this result is that
women (men) are less (more) willing to trade the firms’ money for their own utility when
they feel they have been treated unfairly. This is exacerbated in a context of incomplete con-
3Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018) report considerable gender differences in pref-
erences using an experimentally validated survey dataset from 80,000 individuals across 76 countries. They
show that positive reciprocity and altruism are more pronounced among women, while negative reciprocity
is weaker among women (see table 5 in FBDEHS).
4See Pope and Sydnor (2010) for another example where geographic variation in cultural attitudes and
gender stereotypes is used to understand gender disparities in standardized test scores in the United States.
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tracts, whereby the firm cannot specify every possible contingency regarding the air bookings
performed by its workers. This increases the scope to spend firms’ money by the employee.
The literature on gender differences in economic experiments has studied several traits
for which the documented gender differences may help explain our results.5 Women have
been documented to be more risk averse than men in the vast majority of environments and
tasks for studies selecting members of the general population (as in, e.g., Sunden and Surette
1998; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, and Satterfield 2000; Bernasek and Shwiff 2001).6 If
women are more risk adverse about a price increase they may book earlier. For managers
and professional populations like ours, however, gender differences in risk aversion have been
found to be small or nonexistent (e.g. Masters and Meier 1988; Birley 1989; Johnson and
Powell 1994; Atkinson, Baird, and Frye 2003). There are a number of papers documenting
that women are more generous than men at least in certain contexts. Women have been
shown to be more altruistic (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 1998; Güth, Schmidt, and Sutter
2007) and more cooperative (e.g. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993; Seguino, Stevens, and
Lutz 1996; Ortmann and Tichy 1999; Chermak and Krause 2002) than men.7 Women may
be booking earlier flights to save the firm money, even if they do not receive a direct benefit
or recognition for doing so.
Our paper is also related to the literature on gender performance gaps in real world labor
markets. This literature is quite small due to the difficulties of measuring the output of
individual workers within firms. There are two papers (Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske,
2002; and Gallen, 2018) that study gender productivity gaps by estimating production func-
tions using data on value added and the labor force of firms. These papers estimate the
5See Eckel and Grossman (2008), Croson and Gneezy (2009), and Niederle (2014) for comprehensive
reviews of the literature examining gender differences in economics experiments. See Bertrand (2011) and
Azmat and Petrongolo (2014) for comprehensive reviews of the literature examining the role of experimental
findings on gender differences for labor economics.
6This can sometimes be attributed to women experiencing emotions more strongly than men (e.g. Harsh-
man and Paivio 1987; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001), or to overconfidence of men relative to
women about their relative performance in a task (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). Cite Dohmen, Falk,
Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011).
7These findings, however, do not hold universally (e.g. Brown-Kruse and Hummels 1993; Sell and Wilson
1991; Solow and Kirkwood 2002; Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman 2004; Bolton and Katok 1995; Ortmann and
Tichy 1999). Croson and Gneezy (2009, section 3) attribute the variation in the findings in these studies to
a “differential sensitivity of men and women to the social conditions in the experiment.” They show evidence
that women are more sensitive to the social context of the experiment, by looking within and between a large
number of studies investigating gender differences in social preferences.
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labor input as the sum of different types of labor, including among other things gender, race,
age/experience, education, and occupation. Hellerstein, Neumark, and Troske (2002) use
U.S. survey data on firms from the manufacturing sector. They find a gender productiv-
ity gap, where men are more productive than women. Most of the difference is driven by
non-managerial, non-professional, and younger workers. These results may be specific to the
manufacturing sector. Gallen (2018) uses data on the full Danish economy and finds that,
on one hand, women with children are less productive than men. On the other hand, women
without children are more productive than men. An alternative approach is to focus on a
particular occupation/industry, where individual output can be directly measured. Azmat
and Ferrer (2017) study the performance of young lawyers in the U.S. They find that male
lawyers bill 10 percent more hours and bring in more than twice as much client revenue as
female lawyers. Matsa and Miller (2013) study the behavior of firms that are affected by a
change in gender quotas for corporate board seats in Norway. They find that affected firms
undertake fewer workforce reductions, leading to increased labor costs and reduced short-
term profits. Cook, Diamond, Hall, List, and Oyer (2018) study the performance of Uber
drivers in the U.S. They document a roughly 7% gender earnings gap that can be explained
by experience on the platform, location preference, and preference for driving speed. The
goal of most of these studies is to measure the full output of workers and compare the gender
productivity gap to the gender wage gap. While this paper does not attempt to explain the
gender wage gap, it provides new insights about gender behavior differences within a firm.
We observe the output of our task directly for a variety of firms, occupations, industries, and
countries. In addition, we document an association in the behavioral differences to differ-
ences in economic preferences. Studying business travel bookings is also of interest as it is
likely not sensitive to biological explanations (e.g. physical strength and bearing children)
and more sensitive to differences in preferences.
In summary, we make two main contributions: (1) We document robust gender differences
in the behavior of working professionals, using a large dataset spanning a wide variety of
industries, firms, and countries. Women pay consistently less per ticket and book flights
earlier than men. A large proportion of the lower fares paid by women are explained by
women booking flights earlier than men. (2) We show that cross-country gender differences
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in reciprocity are an important factor associated with the documented gender differences.
In addition, negative reciprocity explains the gender difference in paid fare: women (men)
are less (more) willing to trade the firms’ money for their own utility when they feel they
have been treated unfairly. The documented gender differences have important monetary
implications for firms, and implications for the role of morale within the firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data. Section
3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 discusses potential mechanisms. Finally, section
5 concludes. Details about the computational implementation, and additional robustness
analysis are the appendix.
2 Data Description
We combine data from two sources. The main data contains information about business travel
bookings of workers. Business travel data is an administrative dataset obtained from a large
multinational travel management company. We complement these data with information
about economic preferences in each country. Preference data is obtained from the Global
Preference Survey as presented by Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018,
henceforth FBDEHS). Below we describe these sources. We devote more space to business
travel data, which is novel. Details about the preference data are in FBDEHS.
2.1 Business Travel Data
We collected business travel data from a large multinational travel management company.
This company fulfills the business travel needs of corporate clients in North America, South
America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia. In a given year, this company fulfills tens
of millions of transactions across all travel categories (air, hotel, rental car, rail, etc.). The
geographical scope comprises over 45 countries in which this company has wholly-owned
operations, joint ventures, and minority holdings, plus over 15 countries in their partner
network.
For the analysis, we use a unique administrative dataset, which includes information on
travelers and their business air bookings in 2014. We observe detailed information about
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the bookings: price of the ticket, dates of travel, origin and destination airports, ticket class,
whether or not the flight is direct, date booked, location of the booking. The information
on travelers is anonymous, and is based on the information provided by the travelers to the
airlines needed to perform the booking. This includes the gender and age of the traveler. We
also have anonymous identifiers of the firms where the employee works and the division within
the firm in which the employee works. In our dataset there are over 8, 000 unique firms, and
over 25, 000 unique division-firm pairs. We also have information about the position of the
employee within the division-firm for some firms.
To obtain the final sample used in our analysis, we applied the following selection criterion:
• Only original transactions are included; refunds or ticket modifications are not taken
into account.
• Only round-trip tickets are selected.
• Only routes with 100 tickets or more are included.
• The top 1 percent of the tickets with highest fares are excluded.
The resulting panel dataset has approximately 7.4 million airline transactions correspond-
ing to around 2 million unique travelers. Based on the information in the dataset we con-
structed the following variables: length of the trip in days, number of trips per traveler per
year, and the number of days in advance that the trip was booked.
Table A1 displays summary statistics for selected variables in our dataset. The fare paid
varies considerably as expected, given the heterogeneity in destinations, ticket class, and
the number of days booked in advanced. The mean paid fare is $791.49 and the standard
deviation is $1,021.32. There is also substantial variation in the number of days booked in
advance, with a mean of 18.70 days and a standard deviation of 21.49 days. Table A1 shows
that 25 percent of the trips are booked by female travelers. Although there is considerable
variation in the age of the traveler performing the booking, 65 percent of the trips are
booked by travelers in the age range between 35 and 54 years old. There is also considerable
variation in the number of trips per year performed by the travelers. The majority of the
trips (89 percent) are booked without connection (i.e. “direct” flights) and are booked in
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the “economy” ticket class (89 percent). In terms of the length of the stay, 13 percent of
the trips are performed in the same day (less than 24 hours), 58 percent last more than one
day and less than four days, and the remaining 29 percent last 5 days or more. In terms of
the destinations, 63 percent of the trips are domestic (i.e. origin and destination airports
within same the country), 25 percent are continental (i.e. origin and destination airports
within same the continent), and 13 percent intercontinental. Finally, the trips originating
from North America or the European Union encompass 85 percent of the booked flights.
2.2 Preference Data
We complement the previous data with information about economic preferences in each
country. Preference data is obtained from the Global Preference Survey (GPS) as presented
by FBDEHS. The GPS is an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference
(patience), risk preference (risk taking), positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust
from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. Table A2, obtained from FBDEHS, summarizes the
survey items for each preference. See FBDEHS for a thorough discussion.
For each preference item in table A2, we obtain the gender difference at the country level
reported by FBDEHS (online appendix EB). Then we merge the gender difference preferences
to the business travel data using the country where the traveler works. The country-level
gender preference differences are measured in standard deviations of the respective coun-
try. They represents the mean gender difference by country in the original preference. See
appendix A for details. Table A3 displays summary statistics of the preference data. See
FBDEHS for a detailed description and interpretation.
3 Empirical Results
We begin analyzing business travel purchasing behavior by gender. We find that on average
women pay 104.07 U.S. dollars less per ticket than men (column 1 of table 1). The difference
in fare paid by women and men is endogenous to a number of factors that include the
characteristics of the traveler, the routes and class they travel on, the firms that employ
them, and the position that the traveler holds in the firm. We take advantage of our rich
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dataset to develop multiple covariates for each of these factors. Table 1 displays the results
for several specifications of the difference in fare paid by women compared to men. First, we
condition on basic characteristics of the traveler and flight: age of the traveler, the number
of trips the traveler made that year, whether the flight was direct, and the length of the stay
(the difference, in days, between the day of departure and the day of return). Column 2 in
table 1 shows that conditioning for these basic characteristics explains about 30 percent of the
raw mean difference (−104.065+72.095/−104.065 = 0.307). In column 3, we add 18, 172 fixed effects
for origin-destination route and ticket class interactions (route-class fixed effects henceforth).
Adding route-class fixed effects reduces the gender difference in fare paid to 21.92 U.S. dollars.
Men are more likely to travel on more expensive routes and in a higher ticket classes. In
column 4, conditioning on week of the year and the country where the flight originates, do
not change the difference in the fare paid by gender nor the goodness of the fit. Conditioning
on employee type in the firm (i.e. position of the employees within the division-firm) reduces
the difference to 16.37 U.S. dollars. Finally, in column 6 we add 25, 167 fixed effects for the
division and firm interactions (i.e. unique division-firm combination) where the employee
works. This reduces the coefficient to 15.48 U.S. dollars. Over 85 percent of the raw gender
difference in fare paid is explained by the characteristics of the traveler, the flight, and the
division-firm combination where the traveler works (−104.065+15.482/−104.065 = 0.851). A back
of the envelope calculation shows that a saving of 15.48 U.S. dollars per trip for all the trips
done by the men in each firm, represents a mean (median) saving across firms of 1.90 percent
of the total annual expenditure of the firm in air tickets, or 10,601 U.S. dollars per year for
the mean (median) firm. This represents a savings of about 3.1 (1.9) percent of the median
(mean) price of a plane ticket.8
In the final specification we seek to understand why women pay 15.48 US dollars per ticket
less than men after conditioning for these factors. We show that a major factor explaining
why women pay lower fares is because they book flights earlier than men. In our data,
we have the date of the booking, in addition to the dates of departure and return of the
flights. In column 7, we include 26 fixed effects for how many days the traveler booked in
advanced: a set of 15 dummy variables, one for each of the first 15 days prior to a flight;
8Similar results are obtained when using a log specification for fare paid.
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a set of 10 dummy variables, one for each of the 10 weeks following the first 15 days prior
to a flight; and an additional dummy variable for a booking that took place more than 85
days (85 = 15+10× 7) before the flight.9 We find that accounting for the advanced booking
behavior explains approximately 70 percent of the difference in the fare paid by women not
explained by the covariates in column 6 (−15.482+4.460/−15.482 = 0.711). As regards the overall
goodness of the fit, the adjusted R2 in column 7 is 90.7 percent.
We also report the gender differences for days booked in advance, female interactions, and
a linear probability model for advance booking of female travelers. Column 6 in table A4 in
the appendix, which has a similar structure to table 1, shows that women book on average
1.81 days earlier than men, after accounting for the characteristics of the traveler, the flight,
route-class fixed effects, week and country fixed effects, employee type, and the division-
firm combination where the traveler works. Table 2 reports additional fare paid models
that include interactions between female and other characteristics using the specification in
column 6 of table 1. The difference in the fare paid by gender increases with age. Again, this
is mainly explained because the gender difference in days booked in advance increases with
age.10 Tables 2 and 3 show that gender differences do not depend on the length of stay and
the number of trips per year. Table 3 also shows that gender differences vary considerably
by the region where the worker is based. The specification in column 6 of table A5, which
has a similar structure to table 1, shows that women are 5.3 percent more likely than men
to book a flight two or more weeks in advance. The probability of men of booking a flight
two or more weeks in advance is 44.2 percent. Thus, it represents a substantial increase.11
We also find that using the same set of covariates as in the specification in column 6 of
table 1 (with the obvious modifications) women are less likely to: (i) book a flight in first
class, business class, or premium economy; (ii) book a flight that spans over a weekend; and
(iii) book a direct flight. Finally, for robustness, we repeated all tables and specifications
9We obtained almost identical results using other specifications for the “days booked in advanced fixed
effects,” including a set of 91 dummy variables, one for each day booked in advance before the departure for
the first 90 days and 1 additional dummy variable for more than 90 days. See also footnote 12.
10This can be seen, e.g., in unreported results, where we repeated tables 2 and 3 using “Days Booked in
Advanced” as dependent variable with the specification in column 6 of table A4. See also footnote 12.
11We obtained similar results to the ones in table A5 using linear probability models for booking: one
week or more in advance, three weeks or more in advance, and four weeks or more in advance. We have also
obtained similar interaction results to the ones in tables 2 and 3 using these linear probability models. See
also footnote 12.
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using the subset of the 25 percent most popular routes, and obtained similar results.12
4 Potential Mechanisms
Why do women book earlier than men in the firm? Although the evidence we presented is
correlational, we now discuss potential mechanisms that could explain the observed gender
differences. To do that, we analyze the preference data presented in subsection 2.2.
Tables 4 and 5 display female interactions with gender differences in preferences. Table
4 displays the interactions with paid fare using specification 6 from table 1. Likewise, table
5 displays the interactions in a linear probability model of whether the traveler booked at
least 14 days in advance, using specification 6 from table A5. Column 1 in tables 4 and 5
repeat specification 6 in tables 1 and A5 (respectively) with the sample of countries that
have preference data.13 Similar results to tables 1 and A5 are obtained. Column 1 shows
the base gender difference in fare paid and advanced booking behavior without accounting
for gender differences in preferences. Columns 2 to 7 add interactions between female and
each preference item from table A2. We include both the variable female and the interaction
between female and the preference, because we are interested in both the gender difference
in fare paid and advance booking behavior in a country with no gender difference in a
preference, i.e. the female coefficient, and how the gender difference in fare paid (advance
booking behavior) varies with gender differences in preferences, i.e. the female × preference
coefficient.
Columns 2 to 4 in tables 4 and 5 show that there is no evidence that patience, risk taking,
and altruism play a role explaining lower fares paid or the advance booking behavior by
women. Column 2 shows that the interaction between female and patience is not statistically
different from zero.
Regarding risk taking, one potential explanation of women paying lower fares (booking
earlier), is that women may be more risk adverse about a price increase than men. Although
women have been documented to be more risk averse than men in the vast majority of
12Results reported in this paragraph, footnotes 9, 10, and 11 are available to be include in the paper.
13See appendix A for details about the countries without preference data.
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environments (e.g. Sunden and Surette 1998; Finucane, Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, and Satterfield
2000; Bernasek and Shwiff 2001; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Niederle 2014), column 3 in tables
4 and 5 show that the interaction between female and risk taking is not statistically different
from zero.
Under the altruism hypothesis, women may be more altruistic or generous towards the
firm. For example, women may value the firm more than men, or, thought as a public
good, women may be more willing to contribute more than men to the public good as in,
e.g., Vesterlund, Babcock, and Weingart (2014). However, in column 4 in tables 4 and
5 the interaction between female and altruism is not statistically different from zero. This
indicates that altruism or generosity towards the firm are not the primary driver of the gender
difference either. This is consistent with the results in the economics experimental literature,
where there are not robust differences in average contributions in public good games between
men and women (e.g. Ledyard 1995; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009;
Niederle 2014).
We now consider Positive reciprocity, where someone who has higher reciprocity is some-
one who is more likely to give a “gift in exchange for help” and “to return a favor.” Column 5
in tables 4 and 5 show that the interaction between female and positive reciprocity is statis-
tically different from zero. It is negatively correlated with paid fare and positively correlated
with advance booking behavior as might be expected. However, the coefficient on female is
similar in magnitude to the one in column 1, and is statistically different from zero. This
indicates that although gender differences in positive reciprocity are associated with gender
differences in the fare paid and also the advanced booking behavior, it does not explain the
average behavior differences for both fare paid or advanced booking.
As regards negative reciprocity, we refer to its definition in table A2. A positive interaction
term means that women (men) are less (more) “willing to take revenge and to punish unfair
behavior towards self/others.” In the context of the firm in our empirical setting, the main
insight of negative reciprocity, is that women (men) are less (more) willing to trade the
firms’ money for their own utility if they feel that they have been treated unfairly. This
is exacerbated in a context of incomplete contracts, whereby the firm cannot specify every
possible contingency regarding the air bookings performed by its workers. This increases the
11
scope to spend firms’ money by the employee. FBDEHS show that negative reciprocity is
weaker among women (table 5). Consistent with that, column 6 in table 4 shows that the
interaction between female and negative reciprocity is positive, statistically different from
zero at the 5 percent level, and large in magnitude. Interestingly, the coefficient on female
in column 6 in table 4 is the only one that is not statistically different from zero. Taken
together, these results indicate that women being less willing to trade the firms’ money for
their own utility than men, explains most of the gender difference in paid fare. Also consistent
with this interpretation, while we find that women pay approximately $30 more than men in
Asia compared to the United States (9.288 + 18.935 = 28.22 in table 3), FBDEHS find that
negative reciprocity is less pronounced for women in Asia relative to the United States.14
The results for advanced booking (table 5) are similar. The interaction between female and
negative reciprocity is statistically different from zero, indicating that negative reciprocity can
explain some of gender differences in advanced booking. The advanced booking coefficient on
female is smaller, but still statistically significant though, indicating that negative reciprocity
does not fully explain the overall behavioral differences.
Finally, column 7 in tables 4 and 5 investigates the interaction with trust, in that “people
have only the best intentions,” according to table A2. The results are mixed. On the one
hand, the interaction between female and trust is statistically different from zero in both
tables. On the other, although the magnitude of the female coefficient is reduced, it is still
large in magnitude and statistically different from zero. So trust explains part of the gender
difference in paid fare and advance booking behavior, but not all of it. Gender difference in
trust is highly correlated with negative reciprocity (coefficient of correlation of −0.68). Due
to this collinearity, when both coefficients interactions are included, neither is statistically
significant. The null hypothesis that both are zero is rejected. So one explanation for the
mixed results could be that trust is partially capturing the effect of negative reciprocity,
which have a more clear interpretation in our empirical context. However, we cannot accept
or reject this hypothesis with our data. This is an avenue of further research.
14Obtained by comparing the coefficients (reported next in parenthesis) on negative reciprocity, 1 if fe-
male, from tables 15 and 16 in online appendix EB, for the Asian countries included in those tables, China
(−0.195∗∗∗), Japan (−0.284∗∗∗), South Korea (−0.023), and Vietnam (0.007), relative to the United States
(−0.329∗∗∗).
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5 Concluding Remarks
We documented gender differences in the behavior of similar workers within a firm when they
book business air travel. Women pay consistently less per ticket and book flights earlier than
men. The results are robust after accounting for a large set of covariates that include the
characteristics of the traveler, the routes and class they travel on, the firms that employ them,
and the position that the traveler holds in the firm. A large proportion of the lower fares paid
by women are explained by women booking flights earlier than men. The observed gender
differences in advance booking for business travel results in substantial monetary savings for
the firms.
We complemented the analysis with country-level information on economic preferences
to discuss potential mechanisms that could explain the observed gender differences. We
found that reciprocity is an important factor associated with gender differences in paid fare
and advanced booking behavior. In addition, we showed that gender differences in negative
reciprocity is able explain the observed gender difference in paid fare. The main insight
of this result is that women (men) are less (more) willing to trade the firms’ money for
their own utility when they feel they have been treated unfairly. This is exacerbated in a
context of incomplete contracts, whereby the firm cannot specify every possible contingency
regarding the air bookings performed by its workers. This increases the scope to spend
firms’ money by the employee. The documented gender differences have important monetary
implications for firms as worker behavior can lead to increased costs for the firm. Our findings
also demonstrate the importance of morale within a firm. We have shown that variation in
worker’s preferences for reciprocity are also associated with both extra savings and extra
costs to the firm.
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Table 1: Paid fare by gender.
Dependent variable: paid fare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -104.065∗∗∗ -72.095∗∗∗ -21.923∗∗∗ -21.952∗∗∗ -16.365∗∗∗ -15.482∗∗∗ -4.460∗∗∗
(0.866) (0.821) (0.289) (0.287) (0.293) (0.293) (0.285)
Controls F.E. (13) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (18,172) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week and country F.E. (118) No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Division × firm F.E. (25,167) No No No No No Yes Yes
Days booked in advance F.E. (26) No No No No No No Yes
Number of F.E. included 0 13 18,185 18,303 18,309 43,476 43,502
Adjusted R2 0.0019 0.1240 0.8958 0.8973 0.9013 0.9015 0.9069
Number of observations 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331
Notes: Dependent variable is the paid fare, which is measured in U.S. dollars. “Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age dummy
variables, length of stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy variables. “F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in
the initial column, next to the labels, summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables,
and fixed effects. All regressions are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Table 2: Paid fare: female interactions (part I).
Dependent variable: paid fare (1) (2)
Female ×
(age ≤ 24) -11.752∗∗∗
(2.931)
(25 ≤ age ≤ 34) -13.420∗∗∗
(0.640)
(35 ≤ age ≤ 44) -14.253∗∗∗
(0.489)
(45 ≤ age ≤ 54) -16.285∗∗∗
(0.505)
(55 ≤ age ≤ 64) -18.888∗∗∗
(0.757)
(age ≥ 65) -26.386∗∗∗
(2.422)
(length of stay < 1 day) -10.596∗∗∗
(0.763)
(1 < length of stay ≤ 2 days) -14.537∗∗∗
(0.598)
(2 < length of stay ≤ 3 days) -16.949∗∗∗
(0.619)
(3 < length of stay ≤ 4 days) -18.395∗∗∗
(0.677)
(length of stay ≥ 5 days) -15.719∗∗∗
Controls F.E. (13) Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (18,172) Yes Yes
Week and country F.E.(118) Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) Yes Yes
Division × firm F.E. (25,167) Yes Yes
Number of F.E. included 43,476 43,476
Adjusted R2 0.9015 0.9015
Number of observations 7,430,331 7,430,331
Notes: Dependent variable is the paid fare, which is measured in U.S. dollars. The table displays female
interactions using specification (6) from table 1. “Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age
dummy variables, length of stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy variables.
“F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the bottom of the initial column, next to the labels,
summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables
and fixed effects. All regressions are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Table 3: Paid fare: female interactions (part II).
Dependent variable: paid fare (3) (4)
Female ×
(trips per year ≤ 5) -15.564∗∗∗
(0.419)
(6 ≤ trips per year ≤ 10) -14.089∗∗∗
(0.596)
(11 ≤ trips per year ≤ 15) -16.293∗∗∗
(0.792)
(trips per year ≥ 16) -16.391∗∗∗
(0.653)
Africa -7.812
(4.593)
Australia 2.020
(1.356)
Europe -16.149∗∗∗
(0.512)
Asia 9.288∗∗∗
(1.457)
Middle East 13.669
(9.441)
North America -18.935∗∗∗
(0.397)
South America -10.292∗∗∗
(1.307)
Controls F.E. (13) Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (18,172) Yes Yes
Week and country F.E.(118) Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) Yes Yes
Division × firm F.E. (25,167) Yes Yes
Number of F.E. included 43,476 43,476
Adjusted R2 0.9015 0.9015
Number of observations 7,430,331 7,430,331
Notes: Dependent variable is the paid fare, which is measured in U.S. dollars. The table displays female
interactions using specification (6) from table 1. “Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age
dummy variables, length of stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy variables.
“F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the bottom of the initial column, next to the labels,
summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables
and fixed effects. All regressions are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Table 4: Paid fare: female interactions with preference data.
Dependent variable: paid fare (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -15.782*** -14.988*** -9.688 -9.125* -11.215*** -6.696 -8.294***
(1.636) (2.834) (5.989) (4.057) (2.039) (3.874) (1.756)
Female ×
Patience 9.965
(20.107)
Risk Taking 19.156
(17.857)
Altruism -33.451
(23.608)
Positive Reciprocity -40.989**
(11.976)
Negative Reciprocity 32.441*
(12.500)
Trust -25.619***
(4.329)
Controls F.E. (13) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (16,066) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week and country F.E.(97) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Division × firm F.E. (20,827) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of F.E. included 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009
Adjusted R2 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.899
Number of Observations 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989
Notes: Dependent variable is the paid fare, which is measured in U.S. dollars. The table displays female interactions using specification (6) from table 1.
“Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age dummy variables, length of stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy variables.
“F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the bottom of the initial column, next to the labels, summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each
line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables and fixed effects. See table A2 for a summary of the survey items for each preference. All regressions are OLS
regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Table 5: Probability model for booking two weeks or more in advance: female interactions with preference data.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female 0.0526*** 0.0549*** 0.0378*** 0.0442*** 0.0446*** 0.0413*** 0.0382***
(0.00325) (0.00395) (0.00901) (0.00694) (0.00367) (0.00414) (0.00359)
Female ×
Patience 0.0284
(0.0278)
Risk Taking -0.0467
(0.0272)
Altruism 0.0425
(0.0435)
Positive Reciprocity 0.0724**
(0.0216)
Negative Reciprocity -0.0404*
(0.0173)
Trust 0.0494***
(0.00658)
Controls F.E. (13) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (16,066) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week and country F.E.(97) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Division × firm F.E. (20,827) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of F.E. included 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009 37,009
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189
Number of Observations 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989 7,014,989
Notes: The table displays the estimates of a linear probability model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the traveler booked the flight
with two weeks or more in advance (i.e. if the trip was booked 14 days or more prior to the day of departure), and 0 otherwise. The table displays female
interactions using specification (6) from table A5. “Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age dummy variables, length of stay dummy variables,
and number of trips per traveler dummy variables. “F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the bottom of the initial column, next to the labels,
summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables and fixed effects. See table A2 for a summary of the
survey items for each preference. All regressions are OLS regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Appendix (Not For Publication)
A Details about Preference Data
Preference data is obtained from the Global Preference Survey (GPS) as presented by Falk,
Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018, henceforth FBDEHS). For each pref-
erence item in table A2, we obtain the gender difference at the country-level reported by
FBDEHS (online appendix EB). Then we merge the gender difference preferences to the
business travel data, using the country of the traveler.
The following countries have business travel data, but do not have preference data: An-
gola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Hong Kong,
Honduras, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, Oman, Panama,
Qatar, Singapore, and Trinidad and Tobago. The number of observations from these coun-
tries in the business travel data is 415, 342. Thus, the number of observations drops from
7,430,331 in table A1, to 7,014,989 in table A3.
In online appendix EB (tables 15 and 16), FBDEHS report gender coefficients of several
regressions by country. For each country, they regress the respective preference on a woman
indicator (a dummy variable that equals one if the person is a woman and zero otherwise),
age and its square, and subjective math skills. To make the countries comparable, they
standardize (z-scores) each preference within each country before computing the coefficients.
FBDEHS report the coefficients of the woman indicator for each country. Thus, each coef-
ficient is in the same unit as the original preference measure from the GPS. The coefficient
represents the mean gender difference by country in the original preference. In other words,
a coefficient of 0.1 means that women in a given country report, on average, having 0.1
standard deviations higher in the respective preference compared to men.
B Computational Appendix
All regressions in subsection 3 are OLS regressions implemented using the numerical proce-
dure from Gaure (2013). This is an iterative procedure that relies on the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell
A-1
decomposition theorem15 to avoid the inversion of the matrix of fixed effects. This procedure
results in savings of computing time when the number of fixed effects is large as it is in our
case. The statistical properties of this estimator are the same as the ones of standard OLS
(Gaure 2013), whereby one inverts the matrix with all the fixed effects.
C Additional Tables
15See Frisch and Waugh (1933), Lovell (1963), and Lovell (2008).
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Table A1: Summary statistics of business travel data.
Panel A: Summary statistics of dependent variables
Statistic Nmbr. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Paid fare (in U.S. dollars) 7,430,331 791.49 1,021.32 78.58 7,344.00
Days booked in advance 7,430,331 18.70 21.49 0 102.00
Panel B: Summary statistics of independent variables
Variable Categories Nmbr. Obs. Frequency
Female 0 5,580,934 0.75
1 1,849,397 0.25
Direct flight 0 783,535 0.11
1 6,646,796 0.89
Age ≤ 24 years old 51,978 0.01
(dummy 25-34 1,179,499 0.16
variables) 35-44 2,389,990 0.32
45-54 2,484,516 0.33
55-64 1,194,603 0.16
≥ 65 129,745 0.02
Length of ≤ 1 day 993,459 0.13
stay 1-2 1,612,762 0.22
(dummy 2-3 1,452,302 0.20
variables) 3-4 1,210,453 0.16
≥ 5 2,161,355 0.29
Number of trips ≤ 5 trips per year 2,989,860 0.40
per traveler 6-10 1,658,171 0.22
(dummy 11-15 1,018,922 0.14
variables) ≥ 16 1,763,378 0.24
Ticket class Economy Class 6,631,382 0.89
(dummy Premium Economy 277,022 0.03
variables) Business Class 487,363 0.07
First Class 34,564 0.01
Flight type Domestic 4,664,108 0.63
(dummy Continental 1,910,481 0.25
variables) Intercontinental 855,742 0.12
Region Africa 31,273 0.004
Australia 343,427 0.046
Europe 2,751,059 0.370
Asia 345,982 0.047
Middle East 13,097 0.002
North America 3,568,806 0.480
South America 376,687 0.051
Notes: Each observation represents one roundtrip flight. Panel A displays the summary statistics of the dependent variables
used in tables 1 and A4. Panel B displays, for the independent variables used in those tables, the categories, number of
observations, and frequency by category. In panel B, the total number of observations per variable is 7,430,331, which is the
total number of observations in tables 1 and A4. Similarly, in panel B, the frequencies of the categories per variable sum to 100
percent. See appendix D for definitions of the variables, and fixed effects.
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Table A2: Survey items of the GPS.
Preference Item Description Weight
Patience Intertemporal choice sequence using staircase method 0.712Self-assessment: Willingness to wait 0.288
Risk taking Lottery choice sequence using staircase method 0.473Self-assessment: Willingness to take risks in general 0.527
Positive Gift in exchange for help 0.515
reciprocity Self-assessment: Willingness to return a favor 0.485
Negative Self-assessment: Willingness to take revenge 0.374
reciprocity Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards self 0.313
Self-assessment: Willingness to punish unfair behavior towards others 0.313
Altruism Donation decision 0.635Self-assessment: Willingness to give to good causes 0.365
Trust Self-assessment: People have only the best intentions 1
Source: Obtained from Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018, table 1). See their online appendix AF for the
wording of the questions, and online appendix AI for a discussion of the weights.
Table A3: Summary statistics of preference data.
Panel A: All Observations.
Nmbr. Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Patience 7,014,989 -0.088 0.090 -0.288 0.085
Risk taking 7,014,989 -0.309 0.102 -0.395 0.028
Altruism 7,014,989 0.197 0.066 -0.161 0.406
Positive reciprocity 7,014,989 0.101 0.085 -0.207 0.270
Negative reciprocity 7,014,989 -0.272 0.117 -0.467 0.036
Trust 7,014,989 0.277 0.154 -0.143 0.418
Panel B: By Country.
Nmbr. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Countries
Patience 46 -0.078 0.098 -0.288 0.085
Risk taking 46 -0.203 0.105 -0.395 0.028
Altruism 46 0.139 0.124 -0.161 0.406
Positive reciprocity 46 0.058 0.098 -0.207 0.270
Negative reciprocity 46 -0.161 0.110 -0.467 0.036
Trust 46 0.095 0.128 -0.143 0.418
Notes: Summary statistics from the merged preferences data obtained from the Global Preference Survey (GPS) as presented
by Falk, Becker, Dohmen, Enke, Huffman, and Sunde (2018). For each preference item, the number represents the mean gender
difference by country in the original preference. A positive coefficient means that women in that country have higher values in
the respective preference. The preferences are in the same unit as the original preference measure from the GPS. See table A2
for a summary of the survey items for each preference. See subsection 2.2 and appendix A for details about the preference data.
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Table A4: Days booked in advance by gender.
Dependent variable: Days Booked in Advance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 2.729∗∗∗ 3.009∗∗∗ 2.818∗∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 1.777∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Controls F.E. (13) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (18,172) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week and country F.E. (118) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) No No No No Yes Yes
Division × firm (25,167) No No No No No Yes
Number of F.E. included 0 13 18,185 18,303 18,309 43,476
Adjusted R2 0.0031 0.0742 0.1595 0.1642 0.2275 0.2281
Number of observations 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331
Notes: Dependent variable is the days booked in advance. “Controls” include the following variables: direct flight, age dummy variables, length of
stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy variables. “F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the bottom of the
initial column, next to the labels, summarizes the number of fixed effects included in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables and
fixed effects. All regressions are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. See appendix B for details about the computational
implementation.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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Table A5: Probability model for booking two weeks or more in advance.
Linear probability model for (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
booking two weeks or more in advance
Female 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls F.E. (13) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D route × ticket class F.E. (18,172) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week and country F.E. (66) No No No Yes Yes Yes
Employee type F.E. (6) No No No No Yes Yes
Division × firm F. E. (25,167) No No No No No Yes
Number of F.E. included 0 13 18,185 18,303 18,309 43,476
Adjusted R2 0.0057 0.0757 0.1301 0.1345 0.1904 0.1909
Number of observations 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331 7,430,331
Notes: The table displays the estimates of a linear probability model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equals to 1 if the traveler booked
the flight with two weeks or more in advance (i.e. if the trip was booked 14 days or more prior to the day of departure), and 0 otherwise. “Controls”
include the following variables: direct flight, age dummy variables, length of stay dummy variables, and number of trips per traveler dummy
variables. “F.E.” stands for “Fixed Effects.” The parenthesis in the initial column, next to the labels, summarizes the number of fixed effects included
in each line. See appendix D for definitions of the variables and fixed effects. All regressions are OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The probability of a man booking two weeks or more in advance is: 0.442.
∗ significant at p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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D Definitions of Variables and Fixed Effects
Below we present the definitions of the variables and fixed effects used in the regressions
in subsection 3 and appendix C. See table A2 for a summary of the survey items for the
preference data.
Paid fare: The price of the flight ticket in U.S. dollars.
Days booked in advance: The number of days booked in advanced, as measured by the
difference between the day where the booking was done and the day of departure of the flight.
Female: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the traveler’s gender is female, and 0 otherwise.
Direct flight: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the flight is a direct flight, and 0 otherwise.
A direct flight is defined as a flight between two destinations with no change in flight numbers,
nor stops.
Age: The age of the individual who performs the flight in years. In the regressions we use
“age dummy variables” using the following 6 groups for age: 1) “24 or less,” 2) “(24, 34],” 3)
“(34, 44],” 4) “(44, 54],” 5) “(54, 64],” 6) “greater than 65.” For each individual, each group
represents a dummy variable equals to 1 if the age of the individual belongs to that group,
and zero otherwise.
Length of stay: The length of the trip in days, as measured by the difference between the
day of departure and the day of return. In the regressions we use “length of stay dummy
variables” using the following 5 groups for length of stay: 1) “less than 1 day (i.e. less than
24 hours),” 2) “(1, 2],” 3) “(2, 3],” 4) “(3, 4],” 5) “5 days or more.” For each individual, each
group represents a dummy variable equals to 1 if the length of stay of the individual belongs
to that group, and zero otherwise.
Number of trips per traveler: The number of trips per traveler per year. In the regressions
we use “number of trips per traveler dummy variables” using the following 4 groups for the
number of trips per traveler: 1) “5 trips or less,” 2) “(5, 10],”, 3) “(10, 15],” 4) “(10, 15],” 5)
“16 or more.” For each individual, each group represents a dummy variable equals to 1 if the
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number of trips of the individual belongs to that group, and zero otherwise.
Ticket class: The fare basis code (typically referred to as a fare basis) used by the airlines.
This is a categorical variable that belongs to one of the following 4 groups: 1) “First Class,”
2) “Business Class,” 3) “Premium Economy,” 4) “Economy Class.” In the regressions we use
“ticket class dummy variables,” where for each individual, each group represents a dummy
variable equals to 1 if the ticket class of the individual belongs to that group, and zero
otherwise.
Flight type: This is a categorical variable that belongs to one of the following 3 groups:
1) “Continental,” 2) “Domestic,” 3) “International.” In the regressions we use “flight type
dummy variables,” where for each trip, each group represents a dummy variable equals to 1
if the flight type belongs to that group, and zero otherwise.
Region: A categorical variable that records the region of the world where the flight orig-
inates. The possible regiones are: 1) “Africa,”, 2) “Australia,” 3) “Europe,” 4) “Asia,” 5)
“Middle East,” 6) “North America,” 7) “South America.”
Origin-Destination route fixed effects: A set of 8,192 dummy variables, each corre-
sponding to the unique origin-destination route in our sample (e.g. LAX-ORD is one origin-
destination route). The round trip “from airport A to airport B” and “from airport B to
airport A” are two different dummy variables.
(Origin-Destination route × ticket class) fixed effects: A set of 18,172 dummy vari-
ables, that result from the interaction of “Origin-Destination fixed effects” and the variable
“ticket class.”
Week of the year fixed effects: A set of 52 dummy variables, each corresponding to the
week of the year when the flight is scheduled.
Country fixed effects: A set of 66 dummy variables, each corresponding to the country of
origin of the flight.
Firm fixed effects: A set of 8,067 dummy variables, each corresponding to the firm where
the individual works when booking the flight.
Employee type: A set of 6 dummy variables, with the classification of the employees by
their position within the firm where they work.
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(Division × Firm) Fixed Effects: A set of 25,167 dummy variables, each corresponding
to the unique division-firm combination (the classification of the divisions are unique to each
firm) where the employee works when booking the flight.
Days booked in advance fixed effects: A set of 26 dummy variables, where each of the
them equals 1 depending on how many days or weeks in advanced the booking was made,
defined as follows. A set of 15 dummy variables, one for each of the first 15 days prior to
a flight. A set of 10 dummy variables, one for each of the 10 weeks following the first 15
days prior to a flight. An additional dummy variable for a booking that took place 85 days
(85 = 15 + 10× 7) before the flight.
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